Abstract: Alexander Bird argues for an epistemic account of scientific progress, whereas Darrell Rowbottom argues for a semantic account. Both appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases in support of their accounts. Since the methodological significance of such appeals to intuition is unclear, I think that a new approach might be fruitful at this stage in the debate. So I propose to abandon appeals to intuition and look at scientific practice instead. I discuss two cases that illustrate the way in which scientists make judgments about progress. As far as scientists are concerned, progress is made when scientific discoveries contribute to the increase of scientific knowledge of the following sorts: empirical, theoretical, practical, and methodological. I then propose to articulate an account of progress that does justice to this broad conception of progress employed by scientists. I discuss one way of doing so, namely, by expanding our notion of scientific knowledge to include both know-that and know-how.
In the field of genetics the discovery of the blood groups has also proved to be of importance from the point of view of methodology in the study of the hereditary transmission of other characteristics.
[It] also prompted research on the questionimportant for the study of constitution-whether other body cells in addition to erythrocytes, and in particular the germinal cells, can be differentiated according to specific groups (my emphasis).
According to Hedrén, in addition to the medical applications of his discovery, Landsteiner was awarded the Nobel Prize because his discovery also opened up new avenues of research in several branches of science and it proved to be important methodologically in the study of the hereditary transmission of other characteristics.
In his Nobel Lecture, Landsteiner explained how new methods led to new discoveries. As Landsteiner (1930) said, "it was not the usual chemical methods but the use of serological reagents which led to an important general result in protein chemistry, namely to the knowledge that the proteins in individual animal and plant species differ and are characteristic of each species." 9 This general result proved useful to Landsteiner in his experiments on the phenomenon of agglutination (i.e., when mixing blood from two individuals can lead to blood clumping and the clumped red cells can crack and cause toxic reactions). Before Landsteiner, it was commonly believed that agglutination is a pathology. But Landsteiner showed that it was due to the unique nature of the individual's blood. Blood clumping is an immunological reaction that occurs when the receiver of a blood transfusion has antibodies against the donor blood cells.
Landsteiner then grouped blood types into three groups, which he designated as A, B, and C 9 Available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1930/landsteiner-lecture.pdf.
(which later became O and the AB blood group was subsequently added by others). Because of Landsteiner's work, the first successful blood transfusion took place in Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York in 1907.
Case Study: Pavlov's Work on the Physiology of Digestion
In , Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849 -1936 received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine "in recognition of his work on the physiology of digestion, through which knowledge on vital aspects of the subject has been transformed and enlarged." K. A. H. Mörner (1904) , who delivered the Presentation Speech, opened his speech by saying that "The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge" (my emphasis) and that assessments of progress must be made relative to this aim. According to Mörner (1904) , then, in order to appreciate the significance of Pavlov's work, we must look at the state of knowledge in the field of physiology before Pavlov's work and then see how Pavlov's work improved upon the state of knowledge in the field. According to Mörner (1904) for the study of the physiology of digestion. These epistemic reasons, in terms of the rejection of false beliefs, correction of erroneous opinions, and addition of new knowledge, are the grounds for the judgment that "Pavlov's work on digestion has been found to be of great importance for the study of disease, and undoubtedly the progress made in physiological knowledge in this case as well as in others will lead to a transformation of the concepts of diseases and their treatments" (Mörner 1904) . For these reasons, Pavlov was awarded the 1904 Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine.
In his Nobel Lecture on the physiology of digestion, Pavlov (1904) identified the following aim for physiology:
Precise knowledge of what happens to the food entering the organism must be the subject of ideal physiology, the physiology of the future. Present-day physiology can but engage in the continuous accumulation of material for the achievement of this distant aim (my emphasis).
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After he surveyed the state of knowledge in the field before his contributions and explained how his contributions added to or corrected existing knowledge, Pavlov judged that the science of physiology "is making huge progress every day" (Pavlov 1904 ).
Lessons from Scientific Practice
From the cases of Landsteiner and Pavlov, and others like them, 11 I think that we can discern the following pattern, which seems to be the way scientists make judgments about progress:
1. Survey the body of knowledge B in field F at time t prior to discovery D.
Estimate what was known (B) in F at t.
3. Identify a lacuna, imprecision or error in B at t. In addition to showing that scientists make judgments about progress that are based on epistemic criteria, rather than criteria that have to do with truth alone, the cases of Landsteiner (PK) knowing how to determine blood groups and type human blood; knowing how to carry out safe blood transfusions; knowing how to type dried blood stains in the investigation of crimes where blood stains are left at the scene (though, nowadays, 261). Other distinctions can be drawn between types of data processing, such as data assessment and data reduction (Hacking 1992, pp. 29-64) . For present purposes, however, the important point is that advancements in terms of EK count as scientific progress.
there are other methods of typing, in addition to forensic serology, involving other body fluids and DNA).
(MK) knowing how to purify antibodies to study immunological responses and allergic reactions (since antigens as diverse as bacteria, pollen grains, and foreign red blood cells trigger the synthesis of antibodies in the lymphoid tissue).
As we have seen, Landsteiner was deemed worthy of the Nobel Prize because his discovery led to an increase not only in TK but also in PK and MK. In other words, scientists judged that medical science advanced, due to Landsteiner's work, not only because of the theoretical knowledge of blood types, but also because of the practical knowledge of blood transfusions and forensic serology, and the methodological knowledge of antibody purification.
In Pavlov's case, his work on the physiology of digestion was judged to have been progressive in terms of EK and TK:
(EK) knowing that stimulation of gastric secretion of acid and pepsin and stimulation of pancreatic secretion of digestive enzymes starts with the anticipation of the ingestion of desirable food.
(TK) knowing that stimulation of pancreatic secretion of digestive enzymes is mediated by input to the stomach and pancreas from efferent nerves (i.e., nerves that carry impulses away from the brain or spinal cord) of the vagus; knowing that the stimulation of secretion induced by connecting environmental stimuli with appearance of tasty food is a conditioned reflex.
In addition, and equally important, Pavlov's work was judged to have been progressive in terms of PK and MK as well:
(PK) knowing how to treat peptic and duodenal ulcer disease with selective vagotomy (in selective vagotomy, the branches of the vagus nerve to the gall bladder and pancreas are left intact; usually performed to reduce secretion of acid and pepsin by the stomach to cure a peptic ulcer); knowing how to treat gastric acid-related disorders with selective muscarinic receptor antagonists.
(MK) knowing how to study the anatomy of conscious animals by using surgical techniques, such as the Pavlov gastric pouch.
According to Wood (2004, p. 326) , Pavlov believed that "chronic studies in surgically prepared conscious animals were most likely to yield new insights into the integrated physiology of organ systems in general and the digestive system in particular." Before Pavlov, experimental physiologists worked mostly with anesthetized animals. Pavlov showed that "sequentially repetitive studies in surgically prepared conscious animals are most likely to advance knowledge basic to humans" (Wood 2004, p. 326) . Since Pavlov, it has been a standard methodological principle in physiology that "we must understand the normal functioning of an organ in the alert animal, as well as its anatomy, histology, and cellular biology, to know disease" (Wood 2004, p. 326) . Wood (2004, p. 327 ) also notes that the Pavlov gastric pouch was crucial for "the discovery of the cephalic phase of secretion and its role in the aciticipatory preparation of the upper digestive tract for the ingestion of a meal."
As for PK, Wood (2004, p. 327) Rutherford (1947, p. 178 ):
Scientists are not dependent on the ideas of a single man, but on the combined wisdom of thousands of men, all thinking of the same problem, and each doing his little bit to add to the great structure of knowledge which is gradually being erected.
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I think that any account of scientific progress should be able to do justice to this broad conception of progress, as it is employed by scientists when they acknowledge and reward seminal work, and to the ways in which scientists talk about progress and the aim of science. I think that both (S) and (E), at least as formulated by Bird, fall short of doing that. That is to say, the semantic account of progress in terms of truth and the epistemic account of progress in terms of knowledge are both too narrow to accommodate the broad conception of progress employed by scientists. Here is why.
On (S), we get the following picture of science. The scientific enterprise is a truth-aiming enterprise. That is, the aim of scientific inquiry is truth. Scientists are making progress by approaching this goal. More explicitly, they make progress either by accumulating more true beliefs about nature or by getting increasingly closer to the truth. On (S), we are going somewhere worth going, i.e., truth. We are also collecting something worth collecting, i.e., true beliefs (Godfrey-Smith 2007).
13 Cf. Feyerabend (1987) . As an anonymous referee pointed out, historians of science are becoming increasingly hostile to the "Great Men" style of historiography. This increasing hostility is partly due to the recognition that these "Great Men" stood on the shoulders of others, including lab technicians and assistants, data collectors, experimenters, inventors, and the like. See also Fissell and Cooter (2003, p. 156 ).
There are several objections to this picture of science. For present purposes, however, I
simply wish to see how (S) fares when judged relative to actual scientific practices. And, in the case of Pavlov, the surgical techniques he developed, such as the chronic experiment, were deemed as important as the theoretical knowledge of conditioned reflexes.
Even if (S) is the correct account of progress, and truth is the aim of science, there are still important lessons to be learned from an examination of actual scientific practices. That is to say, the Landsteiner and Pavlov cases teach us that, even if theoretical truth is the ultimate aim of science, there are many "sub aims" that are prerequisites for the "grand aim" of truth. As the Landsteiner and Pavlov cases show, those "sub aims" include error correction, data collection, methodological refinement, and the like.
On (E), we get the following picture of science. Science is a knowledge-seeking enterprise. Scientific progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. (E) takes truth to be necessary (since knowledge is factive), but not sufficient, for scientific progress. In addition to truth, justification and reliable methods are also necessary for scientific progress. 14 In that respect, unlike (S), (E) can begin to account for actual scientific practices. Scientists not only conceive of the aims of science in epistemic terms but also assess scientific progress on the basis of epistemic criteria.
However, the conception of progress offered by (E) is still too narrow to be able to accommodate the broad conception of progress employed by scientists. So I propose to take seriously the lessons of the Landsteiner and Pavlov cases. The lessons are that (a) scientists take scientific knowledge to be the aim of scientific inquiry; (b) scientists make judgments about scientific progress based on epistemic criteria; (c) scientists take scientific knowledge to include not only TK but also EK, PK, and MK. Each contribution to scientific knowledge in terms of one of these types of knowledge counts as progress. Scientists themselves seem to recognize that science advances owing to not only the grand scale theoretical frameworks of theoreticians but also the work of experimenters and data collectors, lab technicians, field workers, and the like.
In the next section, then, I discuss one way of expanding our notion of scientific knowledge, and so our notion of scientific progress as well, so as to accommodate the broad conception of scientific progress employed by scientists. If we grant that 'knowing how' (PK and MK) and 'knowing that' (EK and TK) are both types of scientific knowledge, then we could give an account of progress that might be broad enough to accommodate the broad conception of progress employed by scientists. Granted that PK and MK both count as scientific knowledge, and hence that their accumulation counts as scientific progress, my proposed account of scientific progress is the view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of scientific knowledge, where scientific knowledge consists of each the following: EK, TK, PK, and MK. Each of these counts as scientific knowledge; the accumulation of each advances science.
Varieties of Scientific Knowledge
It seems to me that Baird and Faust (1990, p. 147 (Hall and Hall, 1965-1986, IV, p. 168) . A similar concern for "useful knowledge" also motivated the members of the American Philosophical Society, which was founded in 1743
following the publication of Benjamin Franklin's A Proposal for Promoting Useful Knowledge among the British Plantations in America.
16 Devitt (1984, p. 163 ) says that "not only are scientists learning more and more about the world, but also […] they are learning more and more about how to find out about the world" (cf.
Kitcher 1993, p. 140). Likewise, Kitcher acknowledges practical progress as a goal of science.
But then he sets it aside and goes on to give an account of cognitive progress. The problem, for Kitcher (1993, p. 92) , is that "the notion of practical progress proves far more difficult than we might have thought." However, I think that we can begin to make sense of PK and MK, in the larger context of scientific progress, by taking seriously the lessons of the Landsteiner and Pavlov cases. Since both PK and MK are types of know-how, i.e., 'knowing how to', rather than 'knowing that', one natural way of expanding our conception of scientific knowledge is to grant that 'knowing that' and 'knowing how to' are both types of scientific knowledge. Ryle (1946; 1949) was perhaps the first to distinguish explicitly between 'knowing that p' (propositional knowledge) and 'knowing how to A' (knowledge of skills). Since then, it seems that philosophers have focused mostly on the former. As we have seen, however, PK and MK 16 Available at http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/becomingamer/ideas/text4/amerphilsociety.pdf.
('knowing how to') seem to be of equal importance in science when it comes to assessing progress. When Landsteiner's discovery of blood groups was evaluated by his peers and the Nobel Committee, they didn't seem to consider the medical applications of his discovery as less (or more) important than the theoretical knowledge of blood types. Landsteiner's contributionstheoretical, empirical, practical, and methodological-were judged equally as contributions to scientific knowledge, and hence progressive.
According to Baird and Faust (1990) , when most philosophers of science speak of scientific progress, they focus on theoretical truth and subordinate other aspects of science, such as experimentation, instrumentation, and methodology to theoretical truth. They offer their diagnosis for the source of this mistaken asymmetry (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 148 They urge a conception of scientific progress "broad enough to include the production of new scientific instruments and instrumental techniques" (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 148) . They argue that "scientific knowledge consists of, among other things, scientific instruments and instrumental techniques, and not simply some kind of justified true beliefs" (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 148) . They also argue that scientific knowledge "consists in the ability to do things with nature [as well as] say things about nature" (Baird and Faust 1990, p. 147) . In other words, there is scientific work (i.e., work that is done by some scientists) that is not just about representing nature but also about intervening in nature. As Hacking (1983, p. 149) writes:
Philosophers of science constantly discuss theories and representation of reality, but say almost nothing about experiment, technology, or the use of knowledge to alter the world.
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We can accommodate these insights, I suggest, by granting that know-how counts as scientific 
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In that respect, it is worth noting that scientists don't necessarily employ their conceptions of knowledge and progress consistently in their everyday work. In other words, the fact that scientists' remarks about knowledge and progress are often made in the context of 17 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, one reason why philosophers of science focus on theories (the end result of science) rather than practices might be that most of them are not practicing scientists (although there are exceptions, such as Michael Weisberg). In that respect, it is also important to mention the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP) whose "aim [is] to change [the fact that concern with practice has always been somewhat outside the mainstream of English-language philosophy of science] through a conscious and organized programme of detailed and systematic study of scientific practice that does not dispense with concerns about truth and rationality" (http://www.philosophy-science-practice.org/en/mission-statement/). 18 As an anonymous referee pointed out, in order to understand scientific progress, we might need to expand our notion of scientific knowledge even further-beyond know-that and know-how-to include something like Baird's (2004) notion of "thing knowledge." Roughly speaking, Baird's idea is that things, e.g., scientific instruments, bear knowledge. Doing justice to Baird's material epistemology is beyond the scope of this paper. Astrophysics," Allan Sandage introduced the term "Practical Cosmology." It was an attempt to respond to the charge that cosmology was an "immature" scientific field with plenty of fascinating ideas but no substantial data to confirm them. To address this charge, Sandage and others thought that they must devote more attention to the methodological aspects of their work, specifically the ways in which astronomical observations are conducted and the ways in which data are gathered and analyzed. This was Sandage's vision of practical cosmology, which was discussed recently in the international conference "Problems of Practical Cosmology" (Baryshev 2008 ):
The advancement of cosmology is determined by the growth of observational data and
[…] by the development of fundamental physical theories. Practical cosmology is the science which makes a link between observation and theory. The major goal of practical cosmology is to develop strategies for uncovering and attacking cosmological problems.
Even with the wonderful advanced observational methods available, successful cosmological tests require that we know how to detect and handle different severe selection effects, which may be hidden both in data and, even seemingly secure, methods of data analysis (my emphasis).
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Some of these strategies and methods include the "classical cosmological tests," red-shift surveys, measurements of anisotropies of the cosmic background radiation by balloon and satellite (e.g., the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe) experiments, and fractal techniques. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have taken a historically-informed and practically-engaged approach to the question of scientific progress. I have argued that an examination of actual scientific practices reveals that there is more to scientific progress than the accumulation of true propositions, as proponents of (S) argue. I have also argued that scientists employ a conception of scientific knowledge, and hence of scientific progress, than is broader than what either (S) or (E) can accommodate. I have proposed one way of trying to account for this broad conception of progress as it is employed by scientists, namely, by expanding our notion of scientific knowledge to include both know-that and know-how.
